The increased network reach and customer base of next-generation time and wavelength division multiplexed PON (TWDM-PONs) have necessitated rapid fault detection and subsequent restoration of services to its users. However, direct application of existing solutions for conventional PONs to TWDMPONs is unsuitable as these schemes rely on the loss of signal (LOS) of upstream transmissions to trigger protection switching. As TWDM-PONs are required to potentially use sleep/doze mode optical network units (ONU), the loss of upstream transmission from a sleeping or dozing ONU could erroneously trigger protection switching. Further, TWDM-PONs require its monitoring modules for fiber/device fault detection to be more sensitive than those typically deployed in conventional PONs. To address the above issues, three survivable architectures that are compliant with TWDM-PON specifications are presented in this work. These architectures combine rapid detection and protection switching against multipoint failure, and most importantly do not rely on upstream transmissions for LOS activation. Survivability analyses as well as evaluations of the additional costs incurred to achieve survivability are performed and compared to the unprotected TWDM-PON. Network parameters that impact the maximum achievable network reach, maximum split ratio, connection availability, fault impact, and the incremental reliability costs for each proposed survivable architecture are highlighted. Crown
Introduction
The use of optical fiber technology in the access segment and in backhauling wireless networks has proven to be the most practical yet future-proof solution against the exponential growth of Internet traffic [1] . In terms of access segment, the standardization of second generation passive optical network (PON) systems with aggregate upstream and downstream capacities up to 10 Gbps has recently been finalized by both ITU-T (i.e. NG-PON1) and IEEE (i.e. 10GE-PON) [2, 3] . Beyond 10 Gbps, major carriers have indicated that the following requirements be addressed when choosing the next technology solution: (a) concurrent support of legacy, new, and mobile backhaul services; (b) reuse of existing optical distribution network (ODN); (c) flexible bandwidth upgradeability and management; (d) support of high bandwidth/capacity and customer base; (d) optimized technology combinations in terms of cost, performance and energy savings; and (e) implementation of non-intrusive fault diagnostics with rapid restoration of services [4] . In addressing these requirements, the Full Services Access Network (FSAN) group has selected the time and wavelength division multiplexed PON (TWDM-PON) as the technology solution for NG-PON2 [5] .
A baseline TWDM-PON architecture is schematically shown in Fig. 1 . The optical line terminal (OLT) comprises M transceivers, the remote node comprises a passive splitter, and each ONU comprises a tunable transceiver [6] . The use of tunable transceivers in ONUs allow each to transmit on any of the M upstream wavelengths on the C-minus band and receive on any of the M 0 downstream wavelengths on the C band. A TWDM-PON therefore operates as multiple concurrent TDM-PONs, all sharing the same ODN. Unlike the conventional hybrid TDM/WDM PON whose remote note can house active elements such as optical amplifiers, wavelength multiplexers/demultiplexers, and wavelength switches [7] , the ODN in a TWDM PON must strictly retain the passive nature of a power split TDM-PON. All active equipment are located only at the OLT and ONUs. For example, to support an increased network reach and customer base in a TWDM-PON, optical amplifier(s) are deployed only at the OLT [6] . Recent proof-of-concept demonstrations of TWDM-PONs have used thermally tuned DFB ONUs [6] and current bias tuned VCSEL ONUs [8] as tunable transmitters at the ONU. The VCSEL ONU is considered in this work due to the two following reasons: energy-efficiency and ONU fault detection. Wavelength tuning of a VCSEL ONU through current biasing does not require the use of thermoelectric cooling and heating, thereby improving energy-efficiency of the ONU [8] . In the active mode, the VCSEL ONU consumes 80% less power than a comparable DFB ONU [9] . Further, the high reflectivity of the top distributed Bragg reflector (DBR) mirror of VCSEL ONUs is exploited to detect ONU failures [10, 11] , as will be discussed in Section 2.
As TWDM-PON deployments are to service increased network reach and customer base, providing resilience against fiber/equipment failure through fault detection and subsequent protection switching is an important consideration in the design of the network. Protection switching of the affected signals onto the protection path also prevents hazardous high-power laser exposure at the fiber breaks [11] . One commonly deployed fault monitoring and detection scheme is the optical time domain reflectometry (OTDR). This technique can be implemented offline, but because offline troubleshooting can lead to traffic interruptions and delays in service restoration, in-line OTDR monitoring using a separate light source located at the U band ( $ 1625-1675 nm) is much preferred [12] . Applying OTDR, either offline and in-line, to a TWDM-PON is, however, unreliable and ambiguous. This is due to the fact that the power splitting ODN of a TWDM-PON will cause the backscattered signals from distribution fiber branches to overlap, thus making individual backscattered signals indistinguishable and subsequently the location of the distribution fiber faults unidentifiable.
Survivability in conventional TDM-PONs and WDM-PONs of typically 10-20 km has been extensively explored and is well documented in the literature, e.g. [13] [14] [15] . Many of these exploit the use of a combination of optical switches and fiber/equipment redundancy. These architectures are mostly based on four basic recommended configurations in the ITU G.983.1 [16] . Note that though these basic configurations have been recommended, the ITU-T does not specify the actual fault monitoring and protection scheme to be used, leaving the decision to the network operator. Survivability in hybrid TDM/WDM PONs is also a well-researched topic [7, 17, 18] . Unlike TWDM-PONs, the ODN of a hybrid TDM/ WDM PON may be implemented with active elements, e.g. optical amplifiers, wavelength multiplexers/demultiplexers, and wavelength switches, to improve reach, customer numbers, and bandwidth flexibility. As with the conventional TDM-PON, varying degrees of fiber/equipment duplication are implemented to achieve survivability in a hybrid TDM/WDM PON. A glaring inefficiency in these existing schemes when applied directly to a TWDM-PON lies in the assumption that the absence of upstream transmissions at the central office can be used to activate the LOS alarm, and subsequently trigger protection switches. This technique can lead to erroneous LOS alarm activations when used in conjunction with sleep/doze mode ONUs, as per NG-PON2 recommendation for achieving energy efficiency. During idle periods, the sleep/doze mode ONUs will transition from active into either sleep or doze mode in which no upstream data will be transmitted. Hence, the absence of upstream signals at the central office cannot be used in TWDM-PONs as a true indication of LOS.
In this work, three survivable architectures for TWDM-PONs are proposed to address the shortcomings of existing schemes, as discussed above. The proposed architectures do not need to rely on upstream transmissions to indicate LOS, instead using either the downstream signals or a CW monitoring light for such a purpose. Each of the proposed architecture exploits highly sensitive monitoring modules with fast-response fault detection and subsequent protection switching times. The modules used in this work require very low levels of monitoring input power (o À 50 dBm) for operation [11] . Due to high optical losses associated with increased network reach and customer numbers, monitoring modules that are able to reliably detect faults at low optical input powers are critical to the survivability of the network. Using the sensitivity of the monitoring module as a performance limit on reliable fault detection, the maximum network reach and split ratio for each of these proposed architectures are investigated. Depending on the degree of redundancy, the proposed architectures are able to protect against multipoint failures. Survivability analyses, considering connection availability and fault impact, are also performed. Results highlight that the probability of an intact connection between the central office to ONU and the number of these intact connections are strongly dependent on the degree of protection and network parameters such as deployed fiber length and split ratio. Finally, the incremental reliability cost incurred by implementing backup fiber/equipment in exchange for improved reliability performance is evaluated for each of the proposed architectures and compared to an unprotected TWDM-PON. Results highlight that backup fiber/equipment that is shared amongst ONUs do not significantly contribute to the incremental reliability cost per user whereas backup fiber/equipment dedicated to each ONU dominates the incremental reliability cost per user. RX has a very low bandwidth of 100 kHz, and is designed to detect the envelope of the monitoring light on λ M or the incoming downstream signal on λ S . In our previous work reported in [13] , the response time and sensitivity of the Monitor RX were analytically and experimentally evaluated to be in the order of microsecond scale and À 51 dBm, respectively. Such high sensitivity allows the Monitor RX to be reliably applied in topologies with high propagation losses. Table 1 summarizes the devices and fiber links that are simultaneously protected in each of the proposed survivable architectures. The Type A survivable architecture ( Fig. 2(a) ) protects against feeder fiber failure. A backup feeder fiber that is geographically separated from the primary feeder fiber is added and connected to the OLT through an optical switch, OSW1. Additionally, the optical switch connects both the primary (top) and backup (bottom) feeder fibers to a 2 Â (N þ 2) passive splitter at the remote node. Under normal operation, the optical switch is in BAR state and conversely in CROSS state in the event of a primary feeder fiber cut. A monitoring module located at the OLT adds a CW monitoring wavelength λ M onto the primary feeder fiber. An optical loopback through two connected output ports of the passive splitter reflects a fraction of λ M back to the monitoring module for feeder fiber fault detection. In the event of a primary feeder fiber cut, the monitoring module will detect the absence of λ M and will subsequently trigger the optical switch into CROSS state, diverting all traffic onto the backup feeder fiber.
Survivable TWDM-PON architectures
The Type B architecture ( Fig. 2(b) ) detects simultaneous failures of the OLT and the primary feeder fiber. In this architecture, a backup OLT on standby mode, namely OLT2, and a backup feeder fiber are implemented and deployed at locations that are geographically separated from the primary OLT, namely OLT1, and the primary feeder fiber, respectively. This architecture is analogous to the dual parented GPONs recommended in ITU-T G.984 standard [19] but with an added loopback path implemented by a 2 Â (N þ 2) passive splitter in the remote node. As shown in Fig. 2(b) a second RX Monitor is implemented at the monitoring module, to detect the absence of downstream signals on λ S , thereby allowing OLT1 failures, including power outages in the building where OLT1 is located, to be detected. The absence of λ S will trigger OSW1 into CROSS state and power up OLT2. Traffic from the central office will therefore be transmitted from OLT2 onto the primary feeder fiber of the network. If the λ M is absent when both OLT2 is powered up and OSW1 is in CROSS state, OSW1 will be retriggered back into BAR state such that traffic from OLT2 will traverse the backup feeder fiber. Protection against multipoint failures of OLT1 and the primary feeder fiber is therefore achieved.
In the Type C survivable architecture ( Fig. 2(c) ), complete network redundancy is implemented allowing full protection against all equipment and fiber failures. Two additional 1 Â 3 optical couplers are added in the remote node to provide a physical connection between the primary and backup passive splitters, and to provide optical loopback of λ M and λ S to the central office. Further, two 2 Â N passive splitters are used in this architecture to connect N customers, each through a pair of geographically separated distribution fibers. An additional optical switch, OSW2, and a monitoring module comprising only two RX monitors tuned to λ M and λ S , respectively, are implemented at the input of each ONU and configured as shown in Fig. 2(c) . In addition to centrally controlled protection switching to protect against feeder fiber and OLT faults (similar to Types A and B), the Type C architecture also relies on distributed control to protect against passive splitter, distribution fiber, and ONU transceiver failures.
For example, an absence of λ M at the ONU could signify either a distribution fiber or a passive splitter failure. Once protection switching is activated with OSW2 triggered into CROSS state, the upstream transmission will notify the OLT of the fault through control messaging. At the OLT, if all ONUs are shown to concurrently send this message, then a passive splitter failure rather than individual distribution fiber failures is known to have occurred. In the detection of transceiver (TRX1) failures, the high reflectivity (99.96%) top DBR mirror of a working VCSEL transmitter reflects incoming λ S that will be detected at the monitoring module of the ONU [10] . The absence of λ S in this monitor indicates that the TRX1 has failed. OSW2 will be triggered into CROSS state and TRX2 will be activated. If λ M also becomes absent after the OSW2 has been triggered into CROSS state, this indicates a distribution fiber failure, and OSW2 will be retriggered back into BAR state to ensure that the traffic to and from TRX2 traverses the backup distribution fiber.
3. Impact study of network parameters on survivability and incremental reliability costs
Maximum network reach and customer base
In order to reliably detect fiber/device failures using the monitoring module, the input optical powers of λ M and λ S must be above the sensitivity limit of the monitoring module which was measured to be À 51 dBm in [11] . This sensitivity limits the network reach and/or split ratio that can be deployed in the TWDM-PON. In this sub-section, the maximum network reach as a function of split ratio for each of the proposed survivable architecture is investigated. The typical insertion loss values of all contributing components/fiber for each survivable architecture are listed in Table 2 . Eqs. (1)- (6) The first term on the RHS can be calculated from the sum of component losses listed under column two of Table 2 . To detect feeder fiber fault in the Type B survivable architecture, λ M traverses the 2 Â (N þ 2) passive splitter twice incurring a roundtrip propagation loss of:
To detect OLT fault in the Type B architecture, λ S traverses the 2 Â (N þ2) passive splitter twice, incurring a total roundtrip propagation loss of:
For Type C, λ M and λ S are detected at the central office (CO) for the feeder fiber and 1 Â 3 coupler faults. λ M traverses the 1 Â 3 coupler twice, with a total roundtrip propagation loss of:
As for detecting passive splitter and distribution fiber faults in the Type C architecture, λ M is detected at the ONU and traverses the 1 Â 3 coupler, 2 Â N passive splitter, feeder and distribution fibers once, incurring a total downstream propagation loss of:
To detect transceiver failures in the Type C architecture, λ S is detected at the ONU and traverses two optical switches, a 1 Â 3 coupler, a 2 Â N passive splitter, the feeder and distribution fibers once, incurring a total downstream propagation loss of:
Considering an optical launch power of þ6 dBm for both λ M and λ S , a power margin of 3 dB, and fiber attenuation of 0.25 dB/km, the maximum network reach for reliable detection of λ M and λ S at the monitoring module is evaluated for all three survivable architecture as a function of split ratio. Note that split ratios from 1:8 to 1:128 were considered for each case whereby a 1:N split ratio means N supported ONUs or users. This in turn yields 6 sets of results which are plotted in Fig. 3 . The first four sets evaluate the maximum feeder fiber link lengths, whereas the final two evaluate the maximum total fiber link lengths.
For Type A and Type B architectures, λ M and λ S are looped back at the passive splitter for detection at the central office, and therefore traverse through the passive splitter twice. The roundtrip propagation loss, dominated by the high insertion loss of the splitter that increases with split ratio, severely limits the maximum network reach. Observe that the highest split ratio that can be deployed in Type B is 1:32. Further, when compared to λ S , λ M in Type B incurs a higher roundtrip propagation loss due to its propagation through the higher loss branch of the 80:20 couplers, and hence has a lower maximum network reach for all split ratios considered. As reliable monitoring of both λ M and λ S has to be satisfied in order to achieve reliable fault detection, the Type B architecture must be designed to satisfy the lowest power budget of the two, i.e. the power budget of λ M . The final design of Type B must therefore adhere to the maximum network reach vs. split ratio configuration of λ M (shaded in yellow in Fig. 3 ).
As for the Type C architecture, λ M and λ S are (a) looped back to the CO and (b) also propagated downstream to the ONUs for detection. Since the loopback is achieved through two interconnected 1 Â 3 couplers with fixed insertion loss, the roundtrip propagation loss and hence maximum achievable feeder fiber length are not dependent on the deployed split ratio. In comparison, λ M and λ S that are detected at the ONU propagate once through the passive splitter, where insertion loss increases with split ratio. Therefore, the maximum achievable total fiber link (feeder þdistribution) is inversely proportional to the split ratio.
As with the reason given in the explanation of the Type B architecture, λ M incurs a higher downstream propagation loss and hence a lower maximum fiber link length than λ S for the same split ratio. However, as the reliable monitoring of both λ M and λ S has to be satisfied in order to achieve multipoint fault detection, the Type C architecture must be designed to satisfy the power budget of reliably detecting λ M at the CO and at the ONU (shaded in orange). For example, if deploying a 1:32 split ratio network, the maximum end-to-end network reach for Type C to ensure reliable multipoint fault detection is 71 km with a maximum feeder fiber link length of up to 50 km. For the split ratio of 1:128, although the maximum feeder fiber link is 50 km, the maximum total fiber link is 48 km. Therefore, the deployed feeder fiber link must be shorter than 48 km.
Connection availability and impact of failure
In the evaluation of the connection availability and the impact of fiber/equipment failure on customers carried out in this subsection, we consider both primary and backup equipment and fibers to have the same probability of failure. Further, the primary and backup fibers are identical in link lengths. In an unprotected TWDM-PON with N ONUs, the probability of an intact connection between the central office and any arbitrary ONU i, P ONUi,0 , is given by
where p x , p feeder, and p dist,i denote the probability of failure of equipment x, feeder fiber, and distribution fiber connected to ONU i, respectively. It follows that the probability of an intact connection between the CO and any arbitrary ONU i for Types A, B and C TWDM-PONs is given by
respectively. The parameter p 2 denotes the simultaneous probability of failure of both primary and backup fiber or equipment x. Fig. 4 (a) plots P for the unprotected and Types A, B, and C TWDM-PONs as a function of split ratio. To provide a fair comparison across all architectures, a network reach that takes into consideration the longest maximum achievable total fiber length with the shortest maximum feeder fiber length across all three survivable architectures was implemented for each split ratio. For example, from the results plotted in Fig. 3 , for the 1:8 split ratio, the longest maximum achievable link length was evaluated to be 95 km for the Type C architecture and the shortest maximum feeder fiber length was 29 km for the Type B architecture. As such, all architectures for 1:8 split ratio was evaluated at a network reach of 29 km feeder fiber (FF)þ66 km (¼95-29 km) distribution fiber (DF). Note that the probability of failure of each equipment/fiber p x was based on the corresponding equipment/fiber availability value reported in [7, 20] . The architectures were evaluated and compared for split ratios of up to 1:32 only, as allowed by the Type B architecture due to its λ M power budget limitation. Results in Fig. 4(a) show that for each split ratio considered, the proposed survivable architectures provide an improvement in P ONUi over the unprotected architecture, with Type C providing the best performance. Another point to note is that both Types A and B provide similar improvement in P ONUi over the unprotected architecture. As discussed in Section 2, Type A protects against feeder fiber failure whereas Type B protects against feeder fiber and OLT failures. Therefore, results indicate that the contribution to P ONUi from protecting the feeder fiber is more significant than protecting the OLT. Finally, results in Fig. 4 (a) also indicate that P ONUi of a network is highly dependent on the network reach rather than split ratio. To confirm, Fig. 4 (b) plots P ONUi of the unprotected and proposed survivable architectures with a fixed network reach (i.e. 8 km FFþ 63 km DF) for all architectures. P ONUi varies only minimally as the split ratio is increased. Fig. 5 (a) and (b) plot the average number of impacted customers from CO-ONU connection failures, s. This is calculated using
where N is the number of supported ONUs. Fig. 5(a) compares the unprotected network to the survivable architectures with split ratios up to 1:32 and at a fixed network reach of 8 km FFþ63 km DF. Fig. 5(b) compares the unprotected network to the survivable Type C architecture only with split ratios up to 1:128 as allowed by the Type C power budget. Again, the network reach was fixed to 8 km FFþ63 km DF. Results show that for each architecture considered, increasing the split ratio increases the number of impacted customers. With the Type C architecture, the average number of impacted customers is at least two orders of magnitude lower than the unprotected architecture.
Protection costs
Ensuring survivability in networks through the duplication of fiber/equipment comes at the expense of an increased cost per user. This additional cost is highly dependent on the degree of protection and customer base. In this sub-section, we investigate the additional capital expenditure (CAPEX) incurred by each of the three survivable architectures and compare them to the unprotected TWDM-PON. Here, the measure of incremental reliability cost is used to quantify the additional cost relative to an unprotected architecture. This is the additional cost that is invested in exchange for improved reliability performance. The incremental cost per user is given by where parameter C ONUi is the cost per ONU of a survivable architecture and the parameter C ONUi,0 is the cost per ONU of an unprotected TWDM-PON. The parameters P ONUi and P ONUi,0 are probabilities of an intact CO-ONU connection of a survivable and unprotected network, respectively, as defined and evaluated in Section 3.2. Table 3 lists the cost of each equipment and component implemented in the architectures, normalized to that of a GPON ONU [18] . The cost of the OLT includes the OLT shelf port card, 4 Â 10 G TRX array, AWGs, optical amplifiers, and Layer 2 switching capacity. Also listed are the feeder and distribution fiber per km costs, normalized to a GPON ONU. Note that in these calculations, the feeder fiber cost is lower than that of the distribution fiber, this being attributed to the fact that the former is based on readily available and in-place dark fibers within the metro segment, whereas the latter will need to be newly trenched and individually connected to each customer within the access segment. Fig. 6 (a) plots the incremental reliability costs per user for Types A, B, and C TWDM-PONs as a function of split ratio. The feeder and distribution link lengths for each split ratio were chosen based on evaluations discussed in Section 3.1. Both Types A and B architectures incur minimum additional reliability cost but the Type C architecture incurs almost twice the cost of an unprotected TWDM-PON in return for high reliability. As a reminder, the high reliability of the Type C architecture yields an average number of impacted customers from a fiber/equipment fault that is two orders of magnitude lower than an unprotected architecture (see Section 3.2). When comparing the incremental reliability costs per user of Types A and B architectures, the additional cost in implementing a backup OLT and RX monitor in the Type B architecture is negligible. This is because both these costs are shared costs, divided by the number of ONUs in the network. Fig. 6(b) plots the incremental reliability costs of Types A, B, and C TWDM-PONs as a function of split ratio at the fixed network reach of 8 km feeder fiber length þ63 km distribution fiber length. Results indicate that for Types A and B architectures, the split ratio highly affects the incremental reliability cost as most fiber/equipment added to facilitate survivability is shared between all users. The higher the split ratio or equivalently users, the lower the incremental reliability cost.
As shown in detail in Fig. 7(a) , the split ratio dependency of the incremental reliability costs per user for Type C architecture is negligible. Fig. 7(b) details the breakdown of incremental reliability cost per user for each group of fiber, components, and equipment in the network. The additional cost from deploying the backup distribution fiber between the remote node to each ONU dominates the incremental reliability cost. This normalized cost at 11.25 per km is not shared. Likewise, the second most significant contributor to the incremental reliability cost is the ONU transceivers. An additional backup transceiver per ONU at a normalized cost 3.6 is deployed at each ONU. In comparison, the additional costs associated with the backup feeder fiber, monitors, and components within the remote node are shared between all users, and therefore do not significantly contribute to the overall incremental reliability cost of the Type C architecture.
Summary
In this work, three survivable TWDM-PON architectures which exploit highly sensitive monitoring modules have been proposed. The three architectures vary in the degree of network protection. The Type A survivable architecture provides feeder fiber protection, whilst Type B provides feeder fiber and OLT protection. Due to the redirection of monitoring and downstream signal by a highloss optical splitter for fault detection, these two architectures have limited feeder fiber length. The Type C architecture provides full network protection and allows for a much longer feeder fiber link since the round trip insertion loss experienced by the monitoring and downstream signals is independent of the split ratio. However, reliable detection of both these signals at the ONUs for distribution fiber, passive splitter, and transceiver protection limits the maximum total fiber link (feeder þdistribution) that can be deployed. Based on the probabilistic nature of fiber/device failures, analyses on the connection availability and number of impacted customers were performed. The actual level of improvement in connection availability seen with the deployment of survivable architectures is strongly dependent on a number of factors, including deployed fiber length and the type of survivable architecture. The number of failed connections or impacted customers is dependent not only on the type of survivable architecture and deployed fiber length, but also on the split ratio. Providing resilience in a TWDM-PON comes at the expense of increased cost per user. The incremental reliability cost per user for each of the survivable architectures was evaluated. The higher the degree of protection, the higher the incremental reliability cost per user. The main contribution of this cost lies in the cost of dedicated backup fiber/equipment which is not shared between all users. In summary, TWDM-PONs are being critically investigated to address the future needs of broadband customers and network carriers. The improvement in survivability in the proposed survivable TWDM-PONs as compared to an unprotected TWDM-PON was clearly observed. At present, survivable architectures that achieve full network protection at the expense of high incremental reliability costs would be better suited to servicing business customers rather than residential customers. 
